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Supreme Court Report 
DON'T WRITE OFF THE REAGAN 
SOCIAL AGENDA 
BY NEAL DEVINS 
All presidents seek to further 
their own social policies through liti-
gation. Unlike other administrations, 
}1owever, Reagan's presidency has met 
a firestorm of criticism because its 
views on such divisive issues as civil 
rights, privacy and religion are a sub-
stantial departure from those of its 
predecessors. 
In prior Supreme' Court terms, 
the administration enjoyed some suc-
cess in advancing its agenda. The 
Court approved administration argu~ 
ments that civil rights laws extend 
only to actual recipients of federal 
funds; that Congress intended that 
discriminatory intent-not disparate 
impact-be shown to establish a vio-
lation of civil rights. laws; and that 
Title VII employment discrimination 
remedies should extend only to actual 
victims of discrimination when layoffs 
are involved. The only significant set-
back in this area before 1986 was the 
Court's holding that racially discrimi-
natory private schools are not entitled 
to tax -exempt status. 
Last Term was crucial for the ad-
ministration's social agenda. The 
Court ruled on abortion, affirmative 
action, and religion in the public 
schools. At first glance, the adminis-
tration's social agenda did not fare 
well. 
Despite the aggressive approach 
of Charles Fried, who replaced Rex 
Lee as solicitor general, the Court re-
affirmed Roe v. Wade, validated some 
types of affirmative action, and 
ducked the religion-and-public school 
issue. The justices rejected the ad-
ministration's Baby Doe initiatives 
(hospital care for handicapped new-
borns) and its narrow interpretation 
of the 1982 Voting Rights Act. 
Still, it is difficult to measure the 
true success or failure of the adminis-
tration's initiatives last Term. In con-
trast to Lee, who often sought narrow 
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victories, Fried was willing to press 
the administration's social agenda: ar-
guing that affirmative action is per se 
illegal and that Roe v. Wade should be 
overturned. 
Consequently, although adminis-
tration defeats were not sweeping-
and on occasion the administration 
scored a victory-the 1985-86 Term 
was characterized as a strong rebuke 
to the administration's social agenda. 
Victory or defeat, therefore, tends to 
be measured not by what the Court 
holds, but by whether the solicitor's 
efforts were fully successful. Indeed, 
upon closer examination, the rulings 
of this past Term may pave the way for 
future administration victories. 
ADMINISTRATION DEFEATS 
Abortion. In Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists, 106 S.Ct. 2169 
(1986), the Court voted 5-4 that pro-
visions of Pennsylvania's Abortion 
Control Act were unconstitutional. 
The act required physicians to inform 
women considering an abortion of as-
sociated "detrimental physical and 
psychological effects," and of the med-
ical and other assistance that would 
be available if the pregnancy were car-
ried to term. 
Writing for the majority, Justice 
Blackmun said that "[t]he states are 
not free, under the guise of protecting 
maternal health or potential life, to in-
timidate women into continuing preg-
nancies." 
Thornburgh is important for sev-
eral reasons. First, it extends Roe by 
narrowing the state's right to issue 
regulations associated with the abor-
tion decision. Second, the dissenters 
were particularly harsh in their criti-
cism of the majority .. Justice White, for 
example, characterized the opinion as 
a "warped" and "defensive" response 
to the growing recognition that "many 
in this country [consider Roe] ... to 
be basically illegitimate." 
The solicitor's arguments before 
the Court exemplify both the impor-
tance of the abortion issue to the Rea-
gan social agenda and the differences 
between Fried and Lee as solicitor 
general. Rather than seek a narrow 
ruling approving the Pennsylvania 
statute as a nonobtrusive state effort 
to advance its interest in childbirth, 
the United States for the first time ar-
gued that Roe v. Wade should be over-
ruled. 
Perhaps for this reason, Justice 
Stevens was especially contentious in 
his concurrence, citing articles writ-
ten by then-law professor Charles 
Fried that emphasized the centrality 
of privacy and self-determination. 
The justices' divisiveness on this 
issue indicates the fragility of the 
Court's abortion decisions. Roe v. 
Wade had already been cemented in 
three 1983 Court decisions, but only 
five members of the Court supported 
this decision. At the same time, con-
sidering the firmness of the Court's 
opinion, Roe is not likely to be over-
ruled or severely limited until a mem-
ber of the Thornburgh majority 
leaves the Court. 
Baby Doe Regulations. The De-
partment of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS) promulgated regulations 
to ensure that handicapped newborns 
receive adequate medical treatment. 
The most controversial aspect of 
these regulations required hospitals 
to post notices that warn: that medical 
treatment "should not be withheld 
from handicapped infants solely on 
the basis of their [condition]" and that 
provide a confidential telephone num-
ber for reports of suspected noncom-
pliance. The regulations also required 
state agencies to develop procedures 
for the discovery and review of medi-
cal neglect of handicapped infants. 
A four-member plurality of the 
Court struck down this regulatory 
scheme in Bowen v. American Hos-
pital Association, 106 S.Ct. 2101 
(1986). 
The plurality ruled that adminis-
tration authority was limited under 
Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation 
Act, which prohibits recipients of fed-
eral financial assistance from discrim-
inating on the basis of handicap. 
While recognizing that antidiscrimi-
nation laws include handicapped new-
borns, the plurality ruled that Section 
504 is violated only when a hospital 
denies medical treatment in contra-
vention of the parents' expressed 
preference. 
Moreover, noting that the solici-
tor failed to cite instances in which a 
hospital did in fact violate Section 
504, the plurality concluded that the 
HHS regulatory scheme lacked a 
proper evidentiary basis. 
The majority also invalidated 
state reporting requirements. It ruled 
that rather than ensuring equal treat 
ment to handicapped and nonhandi-
capped infants, these requirements 
function as an "affirmative action" ob-
ligation that would improperly trans-
form state agencies into "foot sol-
diers" in a federal campaign. 
While severely limiting the ad-
ministration's initiative to protect the 
handicapped newborn, American 
Hospital Association is a vulnerable 
precedent. In addition to the three 
dissenters, Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
who recused himself from this case, 
and Associate Justice Scalia might 
well approve a variation of these regu-
lations. In the end, therefore, Baby 
Doe may be an initiative deferred, not 
defeated. 
Affirmative Action. The sound-
est defeat of the administration's so-
cial agenda was its failure to discredit 
race-conscious affirmative action. The 
administration had launched a major 
initiative to follow up Firefighters v. 
Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984), in which 
the justices rejected-as inconsistent 
with the letter and spirit of antidis-
crimination laws-court-ordered af-
firmative action that undercut senior-
ity rights. 
Fifty-one municipalities were no-
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tified that their hiring policies-
which grant preference on the basis of 
race-were under investigation. And 
regulations were drafted to limit a 
1965 executive order that specifies 
that government contractors are ex-
pected to hire a certain percentage of 
minority employees. 
After the Supreme Court ruled 
that preference may be granted to 
nonvictims of discrimination, the ad-
ministration appears to have aban-
doned these efforts, at least temporar-
ily. 
In Wygant v. Jackson Board qf 
Education, 106 S.Ct. 1842 (1986), the 
Court sent a mixed message on the 
constitutionality of affirmative action 
plans. On one hand, the Court found 
that the equal protection clause pro-
hibited a school board from extending 
preferential protection against layoffs 
to nonsenior minority employees. 
But all nine justices indicated 
that a public employer may respond to 
perceived discrimination by develop-
ing a "narrowly tailored" affirmative 
action plan that grants preferences to 
minority candidates in hiring and pro-
motion decisions. The justices, em-
phasizing the desirability of voluntary 
compliance, indicated that a statisti-
cal imbalance-even without a 
finding of intentional discrimination 
"by a court or other competent 
body"-is a sufficient basis for a vol-
untary race-conscious remedial plan. 
This ruling in effect permits pub-
lic employers to use race-conscious 
hiring and promotion plans if their 
employee population is racially 
imbalanced. At the same time, how-
ever, the remedial plans must be "nar-
rowly tailored" to address perceived 
actual discrimination, not societal dis-
crimination. 
In a little known summary order, 
J.A Crosson Company v. Richmond, 
106 S.Ct. 3327 (1986), the Court re-
vealed that it was serious about its 
"narrowly tailored" requirement. In 
Crosson, the Court reversed the 
Fourth Circuit's approval of a Rich-
mond, Va., minority set-aside plan for 
public contracts. 
This plan was passed after a pub-
lic hearing disclosed that despite 
Richmond's substantial minority pop-
ulation, less than 1 percent of con-
struction contracts were awarded to 
minority-owned firms. It reserved 30 
percent of each city construction con-
tract to minority business enterprises. 
The Supreme Court, other than point-
ing to Wygant, did not offer any ex-
planation for its ruling. 
In Local Number 93 v. Cleve-
land, 106 S.Ct. 3063 (1986), the Court 
held that an employer (public or pri-
vate) may develop an affirmative ac-
tion hiring and promotion plan in 
settlement of a statutorily based em-
ployment discrimination (Title VII) 
lawsuit. Specifically, Local 93 vali-
dated a court-approved settlement 
agreement between the city of Cleve-
land and an association of black and 
Hispanic firefighters. 
The decree provided that minor-
ity and nonminority candidates were 
to be promoted on an alternating basis 
to fill 66 lieutenant positions. Follow-
ing these promotions, the city, using 
out-of-turn promotions if necessary, 
was to promote 25 percent minority 
candidates to the lieutenant position. 
The predominantly white fire-
fighters union, along with the United 
States, challenged the decree as in-
consistent with Title VII remedial pro-
visions which provide, in part, that no 
court order shall extend relief to an 
individual "if such individual was re-
fused admission, suspended, or ex-
pelled for any reason other than dis-
crimination on account of race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin." 
The Court did not decide 
whether the settlement agreement 
was outside the bounds of permissible 
court-ordered Title VII relief. Instead 
it ruled that for Title VII purposes, the 
consent decree was identical to a pri-
vate out-of-court settlement. 
The Court concluded that Local 
93 was indistinguishable from Steel-
workers v. Weber, 442 U.S. 927 
(1979), in which it held that a private 
employer may voluntarily adopt a 
race-conscious plan to increase mi-
nority employment. The Court flatly 
rejected the solicitor's argument that 
a consent decree cannot provide 
greater relief than a court could de-
cree after a trial. 
While Local 93 ducked the 
knotty issue of permissible Title VII 
relief, the Court squarely confronted 
it in Local 28 of The Sheet Metal 
Workers v. Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission, 106 S.Ct. 
3019 (1986). 
In Sheet Metal Workers the jus-
tices, by a 4-1-4 vote, rejected the so-
licitor's position that Title VII relief is 
limited to the actual victims of dis-
crimination. A plurality of the Court 
held that Title VII "does not prohibit a 
court from ordering, in appropriate 
circumstances, affirmative race-
conscious relief as a remedy for past 
discrimination." 
Noting the union's "contemptu-
ous racial discrimination and succes-
sive attempts to evade all efforts to 
end that discrimination," the plurality 
upheld the lower court's order that it 
adopt a membership goal to reflect 
the area's minority population (29.23 
percent). 
But the plurality limited the use 
of such relief to instances "where an 
employer or labor union has engaged 
in persistent or egregious discrimina-
tion, or where necessary to dissipate 
the lingering effects of pervasive dis-
crimination." 
As a whole, Wygant, Crosson, 
Local 93, and Sheet Metal Workers 
are not a resounding defeat of the ad-
ministration's agenda. Wygant and 
Crosson only recognized the propri-
ety of "narrowly tailored" race-
conscious remedial programs de-
signed to eradicate perceived actual 
discrimination, not affirmative action 
programs designed to address societal 
discrimination. Moreover, while racial 
imbalance may serve as the basis for a 
remedial plan, the Court will closely 
scrutinize the appropriateness of the 
plan. 
Indeed, both Wygant and Cross-
on rejected the plans at issue. Local 
93, although its consequences are far-
reaching, did not rule on the substan-
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tive civil rights question presented, 
but spoke generally of judicial stan-
dards governing the entry of consent 
decrees. And the Sheet Metal Work-
ers' plurality limited court-ordered 
affirmative action relief to instances of 
intractable, outrageous discrimina-
tion. 
Despite the Court's insistence on 
"narrowly tailored" remedies and its 
general approval of victim-specific re-
lief, these cases might prove the death 
knell to the administration's initia-
tives in affirmative action. This result 
may be due, in part, to the fact that 
Solicitor General Fried sought a 
knockout, rather than a victory on 
points (as his predecessor Lee might 
have done). Consequently, instead of 
these cases being viewed as a severe 
limitation on the use of race-
conscious devices, they have been 
characterized as a defeat of the ad-
ministration's absolutist demand for 
victim-specific relief. 
SOME VICTORIES 
The administration did prevail on 
some issues. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 
106 S.Ct. 2841 (1986), the Court vali-
dated Georgia's anti-sodomy statute, 
and narrowly viewed the right to 
privacy-the cornerstone of Roe v. 
Wade and decisions limiting state au-
thority over an individual's sexual be-
havior. 
The Hardwick majority, echoing 
Attorney General Meese's statements 
on judicial activism, commented that 
"[T]he court is most vulnerable and 
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it 
deals with judge-made constitutional 
law having little or no cognizable 
roots in the language or design of the 
Constitution." 
In Bethel School District No. 401 
v. Fraser, 106 S.Ct. 3159 (1986), the 
Court approved a school official's deci-
sion to suspend a student for making a 
sexually suggestive speech before a 
school assembly. The Court empha-
sized that the "inculcation of values is 
truly the 'work of the schools'" and 
that students only have limited consti-
tutional rights. 
The administration also scored a 
superficial victory in Bender v. Wil-
liamsport Area School District, 106 
S.Ct. 1326 (1986), a case that prom-
ised much more than it delivered. 
Bender arose when a school district 
refused to let a voluntary student reli-
gious group meet on school prem-
ises. 
The administration strongly sup-
ported the student group, claiming 
that permitting such meetings is 
wholly consistent with-indeed re-
quired by-the religion and speech 
clauses of the First Amendment. But 
rather than resolve the substantive 
issue, the Court decided the case on 
standing grounds. 
The Court ruled that because a 
school board member-not the school 
board-appealed a district court 
judgment against the school system, 
the district court judgment must be 
preserved. 
Justices Burger, Powell, Rehn-
quist and White dissented, claiming 
that the substantive issue should have 
been resolved in favor of the student 
group. Opinions by Justices Brennan 
and O'Connor in related cases indi-
cated that they might well side with 
the dissenters on the merits. 
Whether 1985-86 was a good year 
for the Reagan social agenda may not 
be determined for some years to 
come. The Court is not yet prepared 
to embrace the Reagan social agenda. 
Unless there is further change in the 
Court's personnel, the administra-
tion's primary initiatives in school 
prayer, abortion and affirmative action 
will not be fully successful. 
But, perhaps more importantly 
for the long term, the Court's rulings 
on these agenda items were far 
more narrow than is commonly 
understood. 
And the true measure of the ad-
ministration's success should not be 
limited to this Term's results: Atten-
tion must be paid to the changing 
composition of the Court. In this re-
spect, 1985-86 could be the year of the 
administration's greatest success-
William Rehnquist has become chief 
justice and Antonin Scalia an associ-
ate justice. • 
